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Abstract: This paper aims at estimating the effect on achievement of various types of schools: private, private but 
government-dependent and public ones. It is based on the analysis of Math, Science and Reading test scores of 15 
year-olds students surveyed in 2002 across OECD and non-OECD countries. The estimation of the effect of private 
vs. public school attendance may be biased by the existence of confounding factors. An obvious start is to use 
standard (OLS) models to isolate the effect of private/public status from the other determinants of achievement like 
family resources or socio-economic background. But OLS estimates are highly dependent on the validity of the 
linearity assumption i.e. that the effect of school type is uniform across the distribution of covariates. Hence, the 
rational for using non-parametric propensity score matching. The main result is that in most countries examined, 
the type of school has so statistically significant impact on achievement. There is a small group of countries where 
students attending private schools (UK, Brazil) or private government-dependent schools (French-Speaking 
Belgium, France and Ireland) clearly perform better than those attending public schools. But there are also cases 
like Switzerland and Austria where private schools appear less efficient than public schools.  
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Education). 
 
Keywords: education economics, human capital, resource allocation, school choice, multiple treatments 
evaluation, propensity score
                                                 
∗Lecturer, Economics Department, IRES, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1, place Montesquieu, bte 14 , B-1348 Louvain-
la-Neuve, Belgium ; tel  (+32) 10 47 41 41 ; Fax(+32) 10 47 24 00 ; email : vandenberghe@ires.ucl.ac.be. The authors assume 
sole responsibility for remaining omissions and errors. 
** Research Assistant and Marie Curie Post-doctoral Fellow, IRES, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1, place Montesquieu, 
bte 14 , B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium ; email : robin@ires.ucl.ac.be 
  1Introduction 
 
It is clear that the production of education requires monetary resources. Yet, several studies (e.g. Hanushek, 1986; 
Hanushek, 2000) have repeatedly highlighted over the last two decades the fact that there is no mechanical 
relationship between the level of public spending and pupils' results. In this context, economists and other social 
scientists have come to consider that more attention should be paid to the organizational characteristics of schools, 
in particular whether it makes a difference that they are privately run or funded or directly governed by central or 
local public authority. Is there some (robust) evidence that students could gain/loose by transferring from a public 
to a private school? And if so, what is the magnitude of the differential? 
 
The study of existing education systems can provide part of the answer to this question. Indeed, in many countries 
around the world, production of education is far from being a public monopoly. It is thus not a real surprise that 
both private and public schools are represented in the latest OCDE survey on academic achievement used in this 
paper. We are here referring to the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). This survey, carried out 
in 2000, is aimed at testing the competencies in Math, Sciences and Reading of representative samples of 15 year-
olds students across OCDE and non-OECD countries
1. The resulting data set is very rich and can be used to address 
many questions relevant to education policy, one of them being the presence and the magnitude of a private/public 
achievement differential.  
 
To avoid any confusion, the reader should take good note of the way private/public categories are defined by the 
OECD and also the logic underlying this classification. A school was first classified as either public or private 
according to whether a public agency or a private entity had the ultimate decision-making power concerning its 
affairs. A school is public if the principal reported that it was managed directly or indirectly by a public education 
authority, government agency, or by a governing board appointed by government or elected by public franchise. A 
school is considered as private if the principal reported that it was managed directly or indirectly by a non-
government organisation (e.g., a church, a trade union, business or another private institution).  
 
But not all privately managed school are privately funded as often assumed. In the Netherlands, and to a lesser 
extent in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, or Denmark, significant portions of the student/pupil population attend schools 
operated by non-profit private boards largely (up to 90%) funded by public money. The Catholic and Protestant 
churches for example have been very active in establishing private schools. The point is that are now largely 
integrated into the public system via the public funding mechanism. This specificity should be accounted for in an 
analysis aimed at comparing the efficiency of various types of schools. A distinction needs to made between 
government-dependent and independent private schools according to the degree of dependence on government 
funding.  
 
In the OECD survey school principals were asked to specify the percentage of the school’s total funding received in 
a typical school year from: government sources; student fees or school charges paid by parents; benefactors, 
donations, bequests, sponsorships or parental fund-raising; and other sources. Schools were classified as 
government-dependent private if they received 50 per cent or more of their core funding from government agencies 
and independent private if they received less than 50 per cent of their core funding from government agencies.  
  
In brief, this means that in the rest of the paper will try to assess the relative efficiency of tree types of schools: 
private government independent (less that 50%  of public funding), private government dependant (more than 50% 
of public funding) and public schools. 
 
This paper is organized in 4 sections. Section 1 briefly exposes our theoretical framework i.e. the education 
production function we attempt to estimate, as well as the different categories of variables and biases that must be 
accounted for in order to isolate a true private/public effectiveness differential. It also contains the empirical 
strategies used to estimate these models. Section 2 presents the international data set we use, while Section 3 
                                                 
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium (French-Speaking), Belgium (Dutch-Speaking), Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Hong Kong China, Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
  2contains the results of our empirical analysis that we confront to those of previous studies. The last section aims at 
exploring and discussing the potential causes of private-public efficiency differentials. 
 
1. Education Production Function with Private/Public school effect: presentation and 
generic problems 
 
Following Summers & Wolfe (1977) and Toma & Zimmer (2000), we use test scores as a measure of output. We 
assume that academic achievement, at any time period t, is a function of family and school resources, of the 
student’s peers
2, and of the student’s individual characteristics. Conceptually, the model to be estimated at any time 
period t is: 
 
A = f(X)   (1.) 
 
Where A = student's achievement, X= vector of school monetary resources or proxies, student’s characteristics, 
including family/social background, and some characterization of the group of peers. 
 
OLS parametric model 
 
Following McEwan (2001) and Greene (2000), we hypothesize that student i’s achievement (A) in a particular 
country can be explained by linear models of the following form: 
 
 
A=Xα + δ PRIV + γPRIVGD +ε  (2.)  
 
where PRIV is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the ith students attended private government 
independent school and PRIVGD reflecting attendance of a private but government-dependent school. 
 
If the independent variables (X) perfectly control for the student background, then estimating the preceding 
equation with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) could yield unbiased estimates. The estimated value for coefficient δ 
and γ should capture the effectiveness differential between private, private government dependant and public 
schools (serving as reference here and after).  
 
The focus of rest of the paper will be on the sensitivity of these OLS results to relaxation of the assumption of the 
linearity of the private-public effect. 
 
 
Propensity Score Matching:  
 
One of the drawbacks of OLS is that it is dependent on the validity of the linearity assumption underlying equation 
(2). In this expression private-public management effect is supposedly uniform across the distribution of covariates 
and it is assumed to be adequately captured by a dummy variable. Nothing is less certain.  
 
Following Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983; 1985) we therefore complement our OLS model with the non-parametric 
matching approach, potentially more robust to departure from linearity. The underlying principle consists of 
matching together treatment (i.e. pupils attending private or private government schools) and comparison units 
(pupils attending public schools) that are similar in terms of their observable characteristics. This method, like the 
                                                 
2 We indeed assume child's ability to acquire formal knowledge is influenced by the characteristics of his/her peers. Formal 
education inevitably takes place in classrooms where students are together and interact. In turn, these classrooms are part of a 
school where students tend also to interact, generating what pedagogues call peer effects (Slavin, 1987 ; Grisay, 1993 ; 
Gamoran & Nystrand, 1994), sociologists contextual effects (Coleman, 1966, 1988; Jencks & Meyer, 1987; Willms & Echols, 
1992) and economists social externalities (Henderson, Mieskowski & Sauvageau, 1978 ; Hanushek, 1986 ; Brueckner & Lee, 
1989 ; Bénabou, 1993, 1996 ; Glewwe, 1997; Vandenberghe, 2002). 
  3OLS, comes however at a certain cost as it is based on a very strong assumption:  the relevant differences between 
treatment and comparison observations must be fully embedded in the set of observable covariates. Under this 
condition (often reported as the Conditional Independence Assumption, or CIA) estimators relying on matching 
techniques can yield i) unbiased estimates of the treatment ii) that are not dependent on potentially irrelevant 
parametric assumptions (linearity...)  
 
One could match pupils directly on their vector of covariates (i.e. individuals could be stratified into bins, each of 
them characterised by a particular value of Xi). This method however is difficult to implement if the number of 
covariates to control for is large. The number of cells into which the data has to be divided will augment 
exponentially. But Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) suggested a clever way to overcome this problem. They 
actually demonstrate that matching can be done on a single-index variable (the propensity score estimated by 
probit/logit models) that considerably reduces the dimensionality problem, because the conditioning is on a scalar 
rather than on a vector. 
 
Yet, given the nature of our problem (comparing the efficiency of three types of schools), the framework developed 
by Rosenbaum & Rubin for a two-types situation (treated vs. non-treated) need first to be generalized. Fortunately 
for us this has already been done by Lechner (2000) and applied in the context of labour market program evaluation 
by Sianesi (2001).  
 
Lecher & Sianesi assume a set of k different kinds of mutually exclusive treatments
3
 be available to individual i. In 
the context of this paper the choice set of a student and his/her family may contain 2 types of private school 
(private & private government dependant) as well as a public school option. In some countries like Belgium or 
Denmark, it might be the case that the set of choice is more limited containing only two possibilities : a public 
school or one of the two types of private schools (private government-dependent in the case of Belgium). In the 
later case, the Lechner-Sianesi model simplifies an can be equated to the original propensity score matching model 
developed by Rosenbaum & Rubin. 
 
Interest lies in the causal average effect of a treatment relative to another treatment on achievement. A set of 
potential outcomes is correspondingly associated to each of the potential treatments: A0, A1,... Ak, with A,k denoting 
achievement for individual i receiving treatment k. Let T{0, 1, …, K} denote the actual assignment to a specific 
treatment (i.e. attendance of a certain type of school), so that Ti=k if individual i attends type k school.  
 
In what follows, the focus will be on the generalisation of the ‘effect of treatment on the treated’ : the equivalent of 
treatment effect captured by dummies (δ and γ) in equation 2: the pair-wise comparisons of the average effect of 
treatment k relative to treatment k’ conditional on assignment to treatment k, for all combinations of k and k’: 
 
E(Ak–Ak’|T=k) = E(Ak|T=k) – E(Ak’|T=k) for k, k’{0, 1, …, K}, kk’  (3.) 
 
The first term of equation (3) --  the average outcome following treatment k for individuals who have participated 
in k -- is observed in the data. But it is not the case of the counterfactuals of the type E(Ak’|T=k), i.e. all the 
outcomes participants in k would have experienced, on average, had they taken any treatment other than k. 
Identifying assumptions thus need to be invoked to overcome this fundamental missing data problem. One such 
assumption often invoked in evaluation exercises is the conditional independence assumption (CIA). It requires the 
existence of a set of observable characteristics X such that, conditional on their values X=x, the treatment indicator 
T is independent of the entire set of potential outcomes. 
 
T   (A0, A1, …, AK) | X=x,   x∈C*  (4.)  ⊥ ∀
C*  being the set of X values for which the treatment effect is defined 
 
                                                 
3 In fact they assume the stable-unit-treatment-value (SUTVA) assumption has to be fulfilled, requiring the potential outcomes 
for the individual ijust depend on the treatment she received.  That is, there is "no interference between units" and there are "no 
versions of treatments". 
 
  4Since we are just interested in the pair-wise comparison of the various kinds of treatments (i.e. private vs. public or 
private government-dependent vs. public schools), we can relax strong CIA by requiring conditional independence 
to hold only for the sub-populations receiving either treatment k or treatment k’ (Lechner, 2000): all the (outcome-
relevant) differences between individuals choosing treatment k and those selecting into treatment k’ need to be 
captured by covariates the evaluator can control for. 
 
T    (Ak, Ak’) | X=x,   x∈C*, T∈{k, k’} for k, k’ ⊥ ∀ ∈{0, 1, …, K}, k>k’ .   (5.) 
 
The unobserved counterfactuals can thus be identified as: 
 
E(A
k’|T=k) = EX [E(A
k’|T=k, X)|T=k] = EX[E(A
k
 |T=k’, X)|T=k] (6.) 
 
where the inner expectation is identified due to CIA and the outer expectation is taken with respect to the 
distribution of X for participants in k. One could match pupils directly on their vector of covariates (i.e. individuals 
could be stratified into bins, each of them characterised by a particular value of X. This method however is difficult 
to implement if the number of covariates to control for is large. The number of cells into which the data has to be 
divided will augment exponentially. But Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) suggested a clever way to overcome 
this problem. For the single treatment case (T∈{0,1}) they show that the propensity score 
 
Pr(T=1|X)   P ≡
k=1(X)
   (7.) 
 
provides a parsimonious way to adjust for differences in a set of pre-treatment characteristics (X) between treatment 
and non-treatment groups. They actually demonstrate that matching can be done on a single-index variable 
estimated by probit/logit models that considerably reduces the dimensionality problem, because the conditioning is 
on a scalar rather than on a vector.  
 
But we are in a multi treatment context. Can propensity scores still be used to solve the dimensionality problem? 
Lechner (2000) demonstrates that is can. When interested by pair-wise comparisons of the various treatments, the 
conditioning variable (balancing score) of minimal dimension which ensures the balancing of observables X in the 
two sub-populations of interest k and k’ is thus still given by a scalar: the conditional choice probability of 
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k|kk’(X))|T=k]   (9.) 
 
 
For any pair of treatments k and k’, under the CIA assumption that all the outcome-relevant differences between the 
two groups are captured by their observable characteristics X, the average outcome experienced by the matched 
pool of k’-participants thus identifies the counterfactual outcome participants in k would have experienced, on 
average, had they taken treatment k’ instead. 
 
Any standard probability model can be used to estimate the conditional choice probabilities P
k|kk’(X). We have 
opted for a multinomial logit model to calculate predicted probabilities of a respondent being in a certain type of 
school, and then computed conditional scores per se.  
 
Before proceeding to matching, it is necessary to ensure that any combination of characteristics seen among those 
in the treatment group may also be observed among those in the non-treatment group.  In order to adjust for 
differences in X, sufficient overlap is required in the distribution of X by treatment status. In propensity terms the 
so-called common support requirement for all pair-wise conditional parameters translates into: 
  5 
0 < P
k|kk’(X)< 1 for X∈C* and k=0, 1, …, K  (10.) 
 
If there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for the two groups, matching has to be performed over 
the common support region. And the estimated treatment effect has then to be redefined as the mean treatment 
effect for those treated k falling within the common support. 
 
Finally, even with common support the probability of observing two pupils with exactly the same value of P
k|kk’(X) 
is in principle zero since P
k|kk’(X) is a continuous variable. Various methods have been proposed in the literature to 
overcome this difficulty. We have opted here for the so-called nearest neighbour matching approach. It consists of 
an algorithm that matches each pupil attending a type k school with his/her type k' school peer displaying the 
nearest propensity score. 
 
  62. Data set and estimation strategy 
 
Data and variable categories 
 
The data we use to assess the impact of type of  school on achievement is relatively unique and fairly recent. It 
comes from the 2000 OECD survey (the so-called PISA project, Program for International Student Assessment). 
This database contains math, science and reading test scores of students aged 15 across 34 OECD and non-OECD 
countries. These students are nested within schools, potentially attending different grades in countries with grade 
repetition. The test score variable has been normalized
4 to have mean 1 and variance 0. To carry out our analysis, 
we only selected countries for which the number of students sampled and attending private school is above a 1% 
threshold and superior or equal to 50. This leads to a subset of 23 countries or regions containing AUSTRIA, 
French-Speaking Belgium (BEL_FR), Dutch-Speaking Belgium (BEL_D), BRAZIL, Czech Republic (CZ), 
DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, 
LUXEMBOURG, MEXICO, NETHERLANDS, New Zealand (NZ), SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, the 
UK and the USA
5. Justifications for this restriction are twofold. First, it makes no sense, statistically speaking, to 
assess a private school effect in a particular country using test scores of just of few dozen students. Second, policy-
makers who currently discuss the opportunity to expand the private sector (using vouchers for example) are 
interested in knowing whether private or private government-dependent schools make a difference when attended 
by a large (and heterogeneous) population. We are tempted to add that the second argument suggests paying more 
attention to countries for which the (sample) share of private education is large
6, as in Belgium or the Netherlands 
where more than 50% of secondary school students attend a private school. 
 
Table 1 below gives the students’ repartition between public, private and private government-dependent schools, by 
country, for each one of the PISA samples we used (Mathematics, Reading and Sciences). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Referring to equation (1) in section 1, we have selected information about school inputs  via self-reported 
information regarding the availability of teaching material. We use answers provided by heads of school to build 
dummy identifying schools with lack of teaching material (LCTMAT) 
 
The data set (see table 2 for descriptive statistics) is relatively rich in terms of individual characteristics and family 
socio-economic background/status; information that are known to affect academic achievement. We retained 
besides gender (GIRL), the birth order of the student (BRTHORD=1 if student is first born), the highest degree of 
mother (MISCED=1 if she completed some post-secondary degree, MISCED=0 otherwise) the immigration status 
of father (FATHIM=1 if father born outside country of test, FATHIM=0 otherwise), the highest socio-economic 
index of the two parents (HISEI)
 7  as well as an index of cultural resources available at home (HEDRES)
 8. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Of great interest is the peer effect. We define it as the average parental socio-economic index of the student' 
schoolmates (PHISEI), assuming that the peer effect is better captured by the socio-economic mix of the peer 
group.  
 
                                                 
4Normalisation to mean M and standard deviation S, simply transforming x to y with formula y= S*(x-E(x))/Sx + M 
5 We excluded KOR due to important missing data frequency among the variables of interest. We also excluded POLAND and 
PORTUGAL because these countries only report results for reading. 
6 Assuming that the PISA sample is representative of the private/public division in reality. 
7 The last variable is the result of the conversion of Isco-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations) into 
International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI). For further details see 
http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/hg/pisa/index.htm 
8 The last variable is built by the authors following using several items available in the surveys. Technically speaking it 
constists of the estimate of an implicit variable using an Item Response Model  and a Maximum Likelyhood algorithm. 
  7Finally, private schools are identified by dummy variables (PRIV, PRIVFG) equal to 1 by contrast to the public 




We logically focus on the magnitude of the private/public an private government-dependent/public school 
differential. We first measure gross differentials. We do so simply by comparing the mean values of math, science 
and reading test scores of students for each type of school (the gross differential being equal to private mean minus 
public mean). Using the different independent variable potentially explaining academic results we then run the 
traditional OLS models to get a first estimate of net private school effect i.e. accounting for level of resources, 
socio-economic status and peer endowments.  
 
The second and more consequent step is to implement the propensity score approach developed in section 1 using 
the same set of control variables i.e. GIRL, LCTMAT, MISCED, FATHIM HISEI, HEDRES, PHISEI. 
 
  83. Results and analysis 
 
In Tables 5-7 below, we present into great details the three types of results of interest: [1] the gross score 
differential between private, private government-dependent and public students, [2] the coefficient associated to the 
PRIV and PRIVGD dummy (δ, γ) in an OLS regression model,[3] the estimates of the Average Treatment of the 
Treated (ATT) -- in other words, the effect of attending a private school -- with propensity score matching using a 
nearest neighbour algorithm.  
 
[Insert Tables 5-6  about here] 
 
Table 7 and 8 contains information useful to evaluate the quality of matching obtained with our propensity score 
model. It displays the degree of balancing of covariates before and after propensity score matching. These help us 
pinpoint the problematic case of New Zealand where the propensity matching model we used fails to reduce the 
level of asymmetry between covariates.  
 
[Insert Tables 7-8  about here] 
 
 
Table 9 recapitulates the results obtained with the estimation method we trust most: the propensity score matching 
model. 
 
Results per se are essentially fourfold.  
 
First, in most countries examined in this study, the type of school (private, private but government-dependent, 
public) has so statistically significant impact on achievement.  
 
Second, there is a small group of countries where students attending either private schools (UK, Brazil) or private 
government-dependent schools (French-Speaking Belgium, France and Ireland) clearly perform better than those 
attending public schools. Differentials are statistically significant and of great magnitude. Table 9 suggests for 
example that in Brazil private school outperform public ones by 38% of a standard deviation, in French-Speaking 
Belgium by 31%, an by 20%  in France.. But there are also cases like Switzerland and Austria where private 
schools appear significantly less efficient than public schools by respectively 55% and 33% of a standard deviation. 
Compared with the size of estimates generally obtained in the education production function literature, these 
(positive and negative) effects can be considered as sizeable 
 
Third, topics (math, reading, science) matter less than countries. In other words, within a country private, private 
government-dependent vs. public differences tend to appear with similar sign and magnitude for each of the three 
topics. But not all countries display differences between types of schools.  
 
Fourth, a closer look at table 9 suggests there is a systematic advantage to private government-dependent schools 
compared to private schools. But only within countries where both types of privately owned schools exists 
(Austria, France, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland). 
 
[Insert Tables 9  about here] 
 
  94. Further thoughts 
 
Results presented here indicate that private or private government-dependent education can have a significant  -- 
positive or negative -- effect on 15 year-olds' academic achievement. This was shown here using math, reading 
literacy and science test scores.  But it is worth commenting the results into more details. In fact this conclusion is 
only valid for some countries. In the UK and Brazil, private schools outperform public schools. In French-Speaking 
Belgium, France and to a lesser extent Ireland, the efficiency premium goes to private government-dependent 
schools. By contrast, Switzerland and Austria are example of countries where private school perform less well than 
public schools. But for most countries examined here we would rather conclude to the absence of systematic 
advantage to private or private government-dependent schools. Finally, it might be worth noticing than in the few 
countries where both private and private government-dependent schools coexist, the later are more efficient than 
the former.  
 
If private or private government-dependent schools (positive and negative) effects holds only for some countries, 
how can they be explained? And similarly how can one explain that in some other countries privately run schools 
seem to be no more (less) efficient than public ones? Two alternatives, sometimes conflicting, interpretations 
coexist to explain private, private government dependant vs. public effect. The first interpretation, which would be 
favoured by economists, is that the private and public dichotomy in fact points to regulation differences. This is the 
“organizational” interpretation of achievement difference. Following this line of reasoning, private school in the 
UK, Brazil, the French-Speaking community of Belgium, or Ireland could possibly perform better because they are 
granted more autonomy. And maybe private schools have no more autonomy than public ones in all the other 
countries. 
 
The problem with that interpretation is that is doesn't fit very well with our results. It is indeed hard to reconcile the 
'more autonomy-more efficiency assumption' with the poor performance of private schools in Switzerland and 
Austria (bottom of table 9), and – more importantly -- the fact that in the countries where both private and private 
government-dependent schools coexist, the later – presumably less autonomous --  are more efficient than the 
former.  
 
This leads us to a second more cultural interpretation of private/public school differential suggested by  McEwan 
(2000) or Dronkers & Roberts (2003). Rather than talking about “private schools”  effects, it might make more 
sense – at least in some countries like Ireland, Belgium -- to talk about “religious” schools effect. Indeed,  some 
private schools and a majority of private government-dependent schools are, in fine, run by religion-affiliated 
boards (Mc Ewan refers to Catholic Schools in Latin America, Dronkers & Roberts to Protestant Schools in 
Northern Europe). According to this cultural interpretation, the better education received in private or private 
government-dependent schools could be explained by religious values. In fact, the main religions enhance values 
such as hard work, effort, obedience, discipline, and dedication to a task for both students and teachers (maybe also 
parents). This is a very seductive interpretation that tend to fit better to our results than the previous one. But it also 
has its limits. Results presented in this paper suggest indeed that private government-dependent schools in the 
Netherlands or Germany for example, do not outperform public one. But it is an undisputable fact that most of 
private government-dependent schools in those two countries are religion-affiliated. 
 
Further research is needed to explore these two categories of assumptions and maybe other ones. This means that 
we need more detailed data about regulatory environment and management style of both public and private schools 
in countries in which these two types of school cohabit. And as regards private school, following Mc Ewan's 
remarks, we would also need to distinguish private schools with a religious affiliation (catholic, protestant, ...), 
those that are secular or simply for-profit. 
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  12Table 1 - Number of students, breakdown by country and type of school (public/private/private government-
dependent) + category of country according number of types of private schools 
Country Country  cat!  topic  #PRIV  #PRIVGD #PUB  %PRIV  %PRIVGD %PUB 
AUSTRIA PRIVfg  math  142  134  2228  0.06  0.05  0.89 
   read  253  240  4008  0.06  0.05  0.89 
   scie  137  140  2254  0.05  0.06  0.89 
BEL_FR PRIVg  math    1017  432  0.00  0.70  0.30 
   read    1800  766  0.00  0.70  0.30 
   scie    1012  413  0.00  0.71  0.29 
BEL_D PRIVg  math  17  1629  485  0.01  0.76  0.23 
   read  32  2900  814  0.01  0.77  0.22 
   scie  18  1613  468  0.01  0.77  0.22 
BRAZIL PRIVf  math  241    1956  0.11  0.00  0.89 
   read  429    3527  0.11  0.00  0.89 
   scie  243    1950  0.11  0.00  0.89 
CZ PRIVg  math  12  174  2861  0.00  0.06  0.94 
   read  21  313  5003  0.00  0.06  0.94 
   scie  12  175  2860  0.00  0.06  0.94 
DENMARK PRIVg  math   523  1731  0.00  0.23  0.77 
   read    929  3082  0.00  0.23  0.77 
   scie    515  1713  0.00  0.23  0.77 
FINLAND PRIVg  math    87  2616  0.00  0.03  0.97 
   read    150  4714  0.00  0.03  0.97 
   scie    82  2628  0.00  0.03  0.97 
FRANCE PRIVfg  math  177  324  1772  0.08  0.14  0.78 
   read  321  581  3178  0.08  0.14  0.78 
   scie  177  325  1760  0.08  0.14  0.78 
GERMANY PRIVg  math   109  2364  0.00  0.04  0.96 
   read    188  4254  0.00  0.04  0.96 
   scie    105  2388  0.00  0.04  0.96 
GREECE PRIVf  math  83    2425  0.03  0.00  0.97 
   read  145    4353  0.03  0.00  0.97 
   scie  80    2416  0.03  0.00  0.97 
HUNGARY PRIVg  math  17  116  2568  0.01  0.04  0.95 
   read  32  201  4500  0.01  0.04  0.95 
   scie  17  112  2575  0.01  0.04  0.95 
IRELAND PRIVfg  math  58  1267  770  0.03  0.60  0.37 
   read  109  2279  1405  0.03  0.60  0.37 
   scie  59  1264  778  0.03  0.60  0.37 
ITALY PRIVf  math  103  14  2484  0.04  0.01  0.96 
   read  190  29  4468  0.04  0.01  0.95 
   scie  106  17  2482  0.04  0.01  0.95 
JAPAN PRIVf  math  836  18  2047  0.29  0.01  0.71 
   read  1513  32  3672  0.29  0.01  0.70 
   scie  843  17  2033  0.29  0.01  0.70 
LUXEMBOURG PRIVg  math    200 1619  0.00  0.11  0.89 
   read    373  2878  0.00  0.11  0.89 
   scie    205  1584  0.00  0.11  0.89 
MEXICO PRIVf  math  324    1970  0.14  0.00  0.86 
   read  584    3521  0.14  0.00  0.86 
   scie  323    1952  0.14  0.00  0.86 
NETHERLANDS PRIVg  math    936  307  0.00  0.75  0.25 
   read    1698  548  0.00  0.76  0.24 
  13   scie    953  301  0.00  0.76  0.24 
NZ PRIVf  math  83  1  1840  0.04  0.00  0.96 
   read  152  2  3302  0.04  0.00  0.96 
   scie  86  1  1824  0.05  0.00  0.95 
SPAIN PRIVfg  math  268  940  2000  0.08  0.29  0.62 
   read  491  1705  3622  0.08  0.29  0.62 
   scie  273  958  2009  0.08  0.30  0.62 
SWEDEN PRIVg  math    84  2380  0.00  0.03  0.97 
   read    154  4262  0.00  0.03  0.97 
   scie    85  2359  0.00  0.03  0.97 
SWITZERLAND PRIVfg  math  129 58  3004  0.04 0.02  0.94 
   read  223  108  5416  0.04  0.02  0.94 
   scie  127  58  3020  0.04  0.02  0.94 
UK PRIVf  math  231    4601  0.05  0.00  0.95 
   read  421    8255  0.05  0.00  0.95 
   scie  235    4581  0.05  0.00  0.95 
USA PRIVf  math  57  17  1569  0.03  0.01  0.95 
   read  106  30  2811  0.04  0.01  0.95 
   scie  59  15  1546  0.04  0.01  0.95 
!Country category: PRIV: only private schools, PRIVGD: only private government-dependent schools; PRIV/PRIVGD: private and private 
government-dependent schools 
Source: PISA (2000) 
 
  14Table 2 – Summary statistics: math (Mean. Standard Deviation) 
Country girl  lctmat  brthord  misced  fathim hisei hedres  phisei 
AUSTRIA  0.50 0.10 0.36 0.65 0.12  48.96 0.26  49.02 
  0.50 0.29 0.48 0.48 0.33  14.03 0.79 7.50 
BEL_FR  0.51 0.23 0.31 0.63 0.28  50.25 0.07  50.11 
  0.50 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.45  17.26 1.00 9.90 
BEL_D  0.48 0.02 0.36 0.76 0.10  48.20 0.25  48.18 
  0.50 0.15 0.48 0.43 0.30  16.37 0.86 8.32 
BRAZIL  0.52 0.21 0.33 0.31 0.01  42.56  -1.44  42.44 
  0.50 0.40 0.47 0.46 0.11  17.18 1.33  11.21 
CZ  0.53 0.20 0.40 0.92 0.05  48.28 0.06  48.23 
  0.50 0.40 0.49 0.28 0.22  13.71 0.95 6.91 
DENMARK  0.49 0.13 0.34 0.73 0.10  49.77  -0.21  49.68 
  0.50 0.33 0.47 0.44 0.30  15.95 0.95 7.55 
FINLAND  0.52 0.18 0.37 0.64 0.02  50.12 0.03  50.10 
  0.50 0.38 0.48 0.48 0.15  16.39 0.95 7.10 
FRANCE  0.51 0.07 0.33 0.64 0.19  48.33 0.15  48.15 
  0.50 0.25 0.47 0.48 0.39  16.89 0.91 8.85 
GERMANY  0.52 0.18 0.34 0.73 0.18  49.71 0.35  49.62 
  0.50 0.38 0.47 0.45 0.39  15.76 0.73 8.30 
GREECE  0.50 0.71 0.44 0.56 0.05  47.88  -0.38  47.87 
  0.50 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.22  17.99 1.10 9.34 
HUNGARY  0.48 0.12 0.38 0.82 0.03  49.13 0.05  49.08 
  0.50 0.32 0.49 0.39 0.16  15.80 0.93 9.21 
IRELAND  0.52 0.12 0.34 0.58 0.06  48.18  -0.16  48.16 
  0.50 0.33 0.47 0.49 0.23  15.21 1.05 6.24 
ITALY  0.52 0.13 0.40 0.53 0.02  46.82 0.19  46.78 
  0.50 0.33 0.49 0.50 0.15  16.00 0.82 8.43 
JAPAN  0.49 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.00  50.32 0.03  50.88 
  0.50 0.22 0.49 0.00 0.05  15.47 0.91 6.63 
LUXEMBOURG  0.49 0.04 0.34 0.37 0.40  44.27 0.31  44.35 
  0.50 0.21 0.48 0.48 0.49  16.30 0.90 7.16 
MEXICO  0.50 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.04  43.02  -0.68  42.92 
  0.50 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.19  16.99 1.28  10.62 
NETHERLANDS  0.50 0.11 0.34 0.43 0.13  51.46 0.34  51.39 
  0.50 0.31 0.47 0.50 0.34  16.30 0.76 7.27 
NZ  0.48 0.09 0.31 0.70 0.29  52.00  -0.06  52.00 
  0.50 0.29 0.46 0.46 0.46  16.91 1.07 7.54 
SPAIN  0.52 0.14 0.45 0.37 0.04  44.94 0.19  44.90 
  0.50 0.35 0.50 0.48 0.18  16.41 0.83 8.99 
SWEDEN  0.50 0.22 0.35 0.80 0.16  50.36 0.04  50.37 
  0.50 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.36  16.18 0.95 6.89 
SWITZERLAND 0.50  0.03 0.35 0.54 0.27  48.62 0.28  48.59 
  0.50 0.17 0.48 0.50 0.44  16.12 0.83 7.99 
UK  0.50 0.34 0.35 0.74 0.09  50.20  -0.05  50.10 
  0.50 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.29  16.07 1.00 7.90 
USA  0.52 0.04 0.32 0.77 0.19  51.10  -0.30  50.87 
  0.50 0.21 0.47 0.42 0.39  16.38 1.19 7.68 
 N= number of students sampled by country 
Source: PISA (2000) 
 
  15Table 3 – Summary statistics: read (Mean. Standard Deviation) 
Country girl  lctmat  brthord  misced fathim  hisei  hedres  phisei 
AUSTRIA  0.50 0.10 0.35 0.65 0.13  48.93 0.25  48.90 
  0.50 0.30 0.48 0.48 0.33  13.99 0.80 7.08 
BEL_FR  0.51 0.23 0.31 0.64 0.28  50.07 0.10  50.02 
  0.50 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.45  16.99 0.97 9.25 
BEL_D  0.48 0.02 0.35 0.77 0.10  48.63 0.30  48.60 
  0.50 0.15 0.48 0.42 0.30  16.35 0.80 7.82 
BRAZIL  0.52 0.21 0.33 0.31 0.01  42.57  -1.45  42.42 
  0.50 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.11  17.09 1.34  10.29 
CZ  0.54 0.19 0.40 0.92 0.05  48.73 0.10  48.68 
  0.50 0.39 0.49 0.27 0.22  13.90 0.92 6.74 
DENMARK  0.50 0.12 0.35 0.73 0.10  49.72  -0.22  49.66 
  0.50 0.33 0.48 0.44 0.30  16.02 0.93 6.51 
FINLAND  0.52 0.18 0.37 0.65 0.03  50.04 0.01  50.09 
  0.50 0.39 0.48 0.48 0.16  16.23 0.96 6.43 
FRANCE  0.51 0.07 0.34 0.64 0.19  48.09 0.16  47.98 
  0.50 0.25 0.47 0.48 0.40  16.85 0.89 8.23 
GERMANY  0.51 0.17 0.35 0.73 0.18  49.60 0.37  49.52 
  0.50 0.38 0.48 0.44 0.39  15.53 0.72 7.71 
GREECE  0.49 0.71 0.43 0.55 0.05  47.33  -0.37  47.26 
  0.50 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.22  17.82 1.10 8.78 
HUNGARY  0.49 0.12 0.39 0.82 0.03  49.12 0.09  49.10 
  0.50 0.32 0.49 0.38 0.16  15.65 0.92 8.62 
IRELAND  0.52 0.12 0.34 0.57 0.06  48.46  -0.14  48.50 
  0.50 0.33 0.47 0.49 0.24  15.58 1.03 6.09 
ITALY  0.51 0.13 0.40 0.54 0.02  47.03 0.19  46.94 
  0.50 0.33 0.49 0.50 0.15  15.92 0.82 7.86 
JAPAN  0.50 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.00  50.52 0.03  51.14 
  0.50 0.22 0.49 0.00 0.06  15.70 0.91 7.41 
LUXEMBOURG  0.50 0.05 0.35 0.39 0.40  44.58 0.31  44.65 
  0.50 0.21 0.48 0.49 0.49  16.26 0.91 6.72 
MEXICO  0.50 0.37 0.27 0.26 0.04  42.79  -0.68  42.71 
  0.50 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.20  17.15 1.28  10.17 
NETHERLANDS 0.50 0.10 0.34 0.44 0.13  51.60 0.36  51.53 
  0.50 0.30 0.47 0.50 0.34  16.13 0.73 6.64 
NZ  0.49 0.09 0.32 0.70 0.29  51.86  -0.04  51.80 
  0.50 0.29 0.47 0.46 0.45  16.68 1.06 6.72 
SPAIN  0.51 0.14 0.45 0.37 0.04  44.97 0.20  44.94 
  0.50 0.35 0.50 0.48 0.19  16.37 0.84 8.70 
SWEDEN  0.49 0.22 0.36 0.80 0.16  50.64 0.04  50.61 
  0.50 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.36  16.13 0.96 6.23 
SWITZERLAND 0.50  0.03 0.35 0.53 0.27  48.75 0.29  48.79 
  0.50 0.18 0.48 0.50 0.44  16.13 0.82 7.20 
UK  0.50 0.33 0.34 0.75 0.10  50.15  -0.04  50.08 
  0.50 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.29  16.09 1.00 7.20 
USA  0.53 0.04 0.33 0.77 0.19  51.07  -0.32  50.85 
  0.50 0.21 0.47 0.42 0.40  16.45 1.21 7.14 
N= number of students sampled by country 
Source: PISA (2000) 
 
  16Table 4 – Summary statistics: science (Mean. Standard Deviation) 
Country girl  lctmat  brthord  misced fathim hisei hedres phisei 
AUSTRIA 0.50  0.10  0.34  0.66  0.13  48.90  0.23  48.82 
 0.50  0.30  0.47  0.47  0.34  13.79  0.81  7.33 
BEL_FR 0.51  0.22  0.29  0.64  0.29  49.86  0.09  49.79 
 0.50  0.42  0.45  0.48  0.45  16.89  0.96  9.75 
BEL_D 0.47  0.02  0.34  0.77  0.11  48.45  0.28  48.44 
 0.50  0.15  0.47  0.42  0.31  16.41  0.82  8.47 
BRAZIL 0.53  0.21  0.34  0.31  0.01  42.79  -1.45  42.62 
 0.50  0.41  0.47  0.46  0.10  17.34  1.33  11.15 
CZ 0.53  0.19  0.40  0.91  0.05  48.57  0.07  48.53 
 0.50  0.39  0.49  0.28  0.21  13.99  0.93  7.50 
DENMARK 0.50  0.12  0.35  0.73  0.10  49.51  -0.21  49.43 
 0.50  0.33  0.48  0.44  0.29  16.09  0.91  7.21 
FINLAND 0.50  0.18  0.38  0.65  0.02  50.09  0.01  50.13 
 0.50  0.39  0.48  0.48  0.16  16.23  0.97  6.95 
FRANCE 0.51  0.06  0.34  0.64  0.19  48.24  0.16  48.20 
 0.50  0.24  0.47  0.48  0.39  17.02  0.89  8.74 
GERMANY 0.51  0.18  0.35  0.73  0.18  49.62  0.36  49.52 
 0.50  0.38  0.48  0.45  0.39  15.56  0.73  8.06 
GREECE 0.49  0.71  0.43  0.54  0.05  46.35  -0.37  46.38 
 0.50  0.45  0.50  0.50  0.22  17.51  1.10  8.99 
HUNGARY 0.49  0.12  0.38  0.82  0.03  48.76  0.06  48.74 
 0.50  0.32  0.49  0.39  0.16  15.44  0.94  9.10 
IRELAND 0.52  0.12  0.33  0.57  0.06  48.48  -0.15  48.54 
 0.50  0.32  0.47  0.50  0.25  15.68  1.03  6.68 
ITALY 0.52  0.13  0.41  0.54  0.02  47.29  0.20  47.18 
 0.50  0.33  0.49  0.50  0.15  16.08  0.83  8.22 
JAPAN 0.50  0.05  0.39  0.00  0.00  50.78  0.03  51.35 
 0.50  0.22  0.49  0.00  0.05  15.82  0.90  8.17 
LUXEMBOURG 0.51  0.05  0.34  0.40  0.39  44.82  0.31  45.22 
 0.50  0.21  0.47  0.49  0.49  16.21  0.90  6.52 
MEXICO 0.50  0.36  0.27  0.27  0.04  42.69  -0.67  42.68 
 0.50  0.48  0.45  0.44  0.20  17.28  1.28  10.73 
NETHERLANDS 0.50  0.11  0.34  0.45  0.13  51.28  0.35  51.13 
 0.50  0.31  0.47  0.50  0.33  16.32  0.74  7.55 
NZ 0.49  0.09  0.33  0.71  0.28  51.82  -0.05  51.71 
 0.50  0.29  0.47  0.46  0.45  16.70  1.06  7.43 
SPAIN 0.51  0.14  0.44  0.37  0.04  44.97  0.20  44.99 
 0.50  0.34  0.50  0.48  0.18  16.36  0.84  9.12 
SWEDEN 0.50  0.22  0.36  0.80  0.15  50.47  0.06  50.43 
 0.50  0.41  0.48  0.40  0.36  16.31  0.96  7.09 
SWITZERLAND 0.51  0.04 0.35  0.54  0.27  48.83 0.29 48.89 
 0.50  0.19  0.48  0.50  0.45  16.27  0.81  7.96 
UK 0.51  0.33  0.34  0.75  0.10  50.03  -0.05  49.98 
 0.50  0.47  0.47  0.43  0.30  16.06  1.00  7.55 
USA 0.52  0.04  0.33  0.77  0.20  50.92  -0.32  50.81 
 0.50  0.20  0.47  0.42  0.40  16.43  1.22  7.73 
N= number of students sampled by country 
Source: PISA (2000) 
 
  17Table 5: Gross and Net differences between private (PRIV) and public schools (PUB) 














AUSTRIA  0.18 -0.40** -0.35** 0.35 -0.37** -0.25** 0.15 -0.36** -0.41** 
BRAZIL  1.01 0.40**  0.39**  1.10 0.40** 0.46**  0.87 0.40**  0.29* 
FRANCE  0.23  0.01  -0.03 0.20  -0.13** -0.14 0.27  -0.05  0.03 
GREECE  0.62 -0.04  -0.42  0.42 -0.43** -0.33  0.46 -0.26*  -0.08 
IRELAND  0.87 0.32**  0.41  0.91 0.13  0.18  0.89 0.31**  -0.60 
ITALY  0.17 -0.17*  -0.17  0.30 -0.14** -0.22** 0.39  0.09 0.12 
JAPAN  -0.10 -0.09  -0.11  -0.13 -0.19** -0.13  -0.14 -0.22** -0.16 
MEXICO  0.69 -0.14*  -0.06  0.83 -0.21** -0.14  0.60 -0.11  -0.13 
NZ  0.64 0.17  0.48**[u]  0.64 0.05  1.09**[u] 0.70 0.21*  0.44[u] 
SPAIN  0.61  -0.02 -0.30  0.71  0.05 -0.04  0.57  -0.07 -0.11 
SWITZERLAND 0.02 -0.77** -0.56** 0.19 -0.61** -0.51** 0.14 -0.48** -0.58** 
UK  0.98 0.22**  0.74**  0.92 0.14** 0.23  0.86 0.12  0.37 
USA  0.48 0.09  -0.01  0.48 0.12  0.02  0.39 0.02  0.03 
[u]: average standardised bias after matching >10% 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6: Gross and Net differences between private government-dependent (PRIVGD) and public schools (PUB) 














AUSTRIA  0.31 -0.48**  0.03  0.41 -0.46**  0.06  0.30 -0.38**  -0.12 
BEL_FR  0.44 0.17**  0.23**  0.48 0.26**  0.37**  0.35 0.20**  0.32** 
BEL_D  0.62 0.18**  0.07 0.68 0.26**  0.28**  0.59 0.13**  -0.10 
CZ  -0.15  -0.13*  -0.33**  0.08 0.06 0.09  -0.04  -0.10 0.10 
DENMARK  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
FINLAND  0.11 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.16 
FRANCE  -0.01 0.25**  0.26**  -0.06 0.02 0.24**  -0.08 0.03 0.09 
GERMANY  0.49 -0.09  0.03  0.64 -0.04 -0.09  0.53  0.04 -0.03 
HUNGARY  0.17 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.01  -0.14 0.18 0.05 0.05 
IRELAND  0.26 0.42**  0.09 0.41 0.27**  0.13**  0.39 0.53**  0.24** 
LUXEMBOURG  -0.40  -0.07 0.00  -0.08 0.06  -0.18  -0.15 0.15**  0.00[u] 
NETHERLANDS 0.17  0.02  -0.07  0.15  0.07  -0.02  0.08  -0.01  0.12 
SPAIN  0.31 0.08**  0.07 0.35 0.14**  0.04 0.32 0.02 0.05 
SWEDEN -0.07  -0.16  -0.24  0.16  0.06  0.13  -0.09  -0.12  -0.19 
SWITZERLAND 0.24  -0.67** 0.31  0.35  -0.55** -0.11  0.31  -0.36** 0.17 
[u]: average standardised bias after matching >10% 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
 
  18Table 7: Balancing of covariates: average (absolute) standardised bias before and after propensity score 
matching : private (PRIV) and public schools (PUB) 
    Average Bias  Average Bias 
Country topic 
Before 
Matching After  matching
Before 
Matching After  matching 
AUSTRIA math  24.15  -2.78  35.82  9.42 
 read  24.46  2.20  38.56  5.68 
 scie  15.92  -0.54  33.64  3.66 
BRAZIL math  59.70  -0.73  81.14  4.70 
 read  61.71  -0.06  81.64  7.10 
 scie  60.55  3.27  81.37  5.99 
FRANCE math  10.41  -1.61  19.37  6.52 
 read  13.06  6.60  21.33  10.63 
 scie  13.53  -1.17  21.28  6.71 
GREECE math  21.57  9.16  57.99  30.90 
 read  23.16  9.65  58.66  33.59 
 scie  27.13  -4.83  58.86  46.44 
IRELAND math  63.09  -7.78  78.51  21.29 
 read  69.25  6.91  82.16  29.56 
 scie  69.10  -6.13  81.92  65.22 
ITALY math  20.36  -7.63  37.26  7.63 
 read  15.59  -3.88  33.76  5.22 
 scie  10.73  0.62  34.16  6.71 
JAPAN math  1.79  0.66  19.57  2.33 
 read  1.94  2.74  19.55  7.84 
 scie  5.96  4.78  24.02  8.45 
MEXICO math  65.10  -0.27  78.82  11.08 
 read  65.50  8.20  80.39  27.20 
 scie  64.46  0.78  78.97  17.10 
NZ math  43.58  -3.94  55.83  5.39 
 read  50.30  40.17  61.74 60.17 
 scie  44.57  12.54  57.30 24.56 
SPAIN math  53.48  15.78  72.44 18.50 
 read  51.94  1.13  72.14  12.78 
 scie  51.84  -7.07  70.43  11.97 
SWITZERLAND math  51.77 -3.57 54.55 15.03 
 read  48.67  7.75  49.96  11.74 
 scie  44.40  -4.07  45.99  8.09 
UK math  50.82  -3.63  79.28  11.91 
 read  49.97  -0.76  79.57  15.02 
 scie  46.57  -0.49  77.11  11.39 
USA math  32.77  -3.92  40.57  7.02 
 read  20.13  -1.27  28.79  6.44 
 scie  25.09  -8.71  33.23  12.54 
Note: this table reports for each country and each topic the average (absolute) standardised bias of the different covariates. For 
a given covariate/regressor. the standardised (absolute) difference after matching is defined as the (absolute value of the) 
difference of the sample means in the treated and matched comparison sub-samples as a percentage of the square root 
of the average of the sample variances in the treated and comparison groups (cf. Rosenbaum & Rubin. 1985). 
source: PISA (2000) 
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    Average Bias  Average Bias 
Country topic 
Before 
Matching After  matching
Before 
Matching After  matching 
AUSTRIA math  28.97  4.60  29.24  5.71 
 read  27.51  -0.02  27.51  4.37 
 scie  28.75  0.55  28.75  4.20 
BEL_FR math  18.95  4.15  23.09  13.16 
 read  16.82  1.38  20.48  7.75 
 scie  10.88  1.90  15.36  13.26 
BEL_D math  18.21  -1.76  26.99  4.58 
 read  15.36  0.72  23.38  11.44 
 scie  19.55  -1.20  26.34  23.65 
CZ math  -2.48  -4.30  14.74  10.59 
 read  -4.16  1.60  14.15  3.80 
 scie  2.49  3.02  13.85  6.55 
DENMARK math  0.12  -0.03  10.24  2.21 
 read  2.67  -1.81  12.55  3.65 
 scie  4.10  0.98  13.98  4.62 
FINLAND math  15.78  -0.25  27.62  6.38 
 read  11.78  2.80  22.75  6.75 
 scie  11.14  9.92  24.33  11.88 
FRANCE math  -5.87  -0.08  17.53  3.71 
 read  -4.52  -1.09  15.23  2.28 
 scie  -2.67  -1.63  15.12  4.17 
GERMANY math  30.15  2.02  43.95  9.07 
 read  28.79  1.47  39.74  6.30 
 scie  29.58  -4.52  38.59  9.01 
HUNGARY math  0.21  -1.77  11.55  7.61 
 read  3.19  -4.02  13.34  5.52 
 scie  2.73  4.37  13.17  16.47 
IRELAND math  20.74  -6.19  21.49  13.09 
 read  22.72  -6.49  23.01  8.84 
 scie  22.99  -0.25  23.88  10.15 
LUXEMBOURG math  3.78  1.18 41.18 15.72 
 read  2.10  -2.14  40.27  4.44 
 scie  -3.81  -10.13  46.27 16.67 
NETHERLAND math  4.50 -3.48  14.80 7.20 
 read  1.82  -0.50  12.65  3.85 
 scie  1.89  3.14  13.41  3.73 
SPAIN math  8.60  0.86  19.57  5.62 
 read  10.56  -0.46  20.72  2.79 
 scie  10.94  -0.04  20.43  3.87 
SWEDEN math  21.32  -7.65  23.13  10.30 
 read  25.17  -0.67  28.52  4.63 
 scie  22.51  5.82  30.53  7.91 
SWITZERLAND math  17.25 5.37  20.41 13.35 
 read  18.68  -2.75  22.37  4.24 
 scie  11.20  -3.81  19.47  13.82 
Note: this table reports for each country and each topic the average (absolute) standardised bias of the different covariates. For 
a given covariate/regressor. the standardised (absolute) difference after matching is defined as the (absolute value of the) 
difference of the sample means in the treated and matched comparison sub-samples as a percentage of the square root 
of the average of the sample variances in the treated and comparison groups (cf. Rosenbaum & Rubin. 1985). 
source: PISA (2000) 
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Table 9 - Net difference between private, private government-dependent and public school achievement: recap for 
propensity score matching estimates 
Country  Type of private school Math  Reading  Science  Average 
NZ PRIV  0.48**[u] 1.09**[u] 0.44[u]  0,67 
UK PRIV  0.74**  0.23  0.37  0,45 
BRAZIL PRIV  0.39**  0.46**  0.29*  0,38 
BEL_FR PRIVGD  0.23**  0.37**  0.32**  0,31 
FRANCE PRIVGD  0.26**  0.24**  0.09  0,20 
FINLAND PRIVGD  0.21  0.11  0.16  0,16 
IRELAND PRIVGD  0.09  0.13**  0.24**  0,15 
SWITZERLAND PRIVGD 0.31  -0.11  0.17  0,12 
BEL_D PRIVGD  0.07  0.28**  -0.10  0,09 
SPAIN PRIVGD  0.07  0.04  0.05  0,05 
HUNGARY PRIVGD  0.15  -0.14  0.05  0,02 
USA PRIV  -0.01  0.02  0.03  0,01 
NETHERLANDS PRIVGD  -0.07  -0.02  0.12  0,01 
IRELAND PRIV  0.41  0.18  -0.60  0,00 
AUSTRIA PRIVGD  0.03  0.06  -0.12  -0,01 
DENMARK PRIVGD  0.04  -0.05  -0.04  -0,02 
GERMANY PRIVGD  0.03  -0.09  -0.03  -0,03 
FRANCE PRIV  -0.03  -0.14  0.03  -0,05 
CZ PRIVGD  -0.33**  0.09  0.10  -0,05 
LUXEMBOURG PRIVGD  0.00  -0.18  0.00[u]  -0,06 
ITALY PRIV  -0.17  -0.22**  0.12  -0,09 
SWEDEN PRIVGD  -0.24  0.13  -0.19  -0,10 
MEXICO PRIV  -0.06  -0.14  -0.13  -0,11 
JAPAN PRIV  -0.11  -0.13  -0.16  -0,14 
SPAIN PRIV  -0.30  -0.04  -0.11  -0,15 
GREECE PRIV  -0.42  -0.33  -0.08  -0,28 
AUSTRIA PRIV  -0.35**  -0.25**  -0.41**  -0,33 
SWITZERLAND PRIV  -0.56** -0.51** -0.58**  -0,55 
[u]: average standardised bias after matching >10% 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
source: PISA (2000) 
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